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Abstract
In this article, we examine the foreign policy implications of different types of investment flows. North-
South investment is more sensitive to political risks (expropriation, default, civil war) than North-North
investment. We argue that North-South investment flows create a constituency within the U.S. finan-
cial sector that is likely to support stabilising intervention – military intervention aimed at reducing
political risk abroad. Examining PAC donations from Fortune 500 financial firms with a cross-sectional
Tobit model, we find that U.S. financial firms with greater exposure to the Global South are likely to
favour congressional candidates with a record of voting for intervention in developing countries. The
study contributes to the literature on economic interdependence and peace, proposes an original method
for capturing the revealed preferences of political actors, and enhances our understanding of the sectoral
underpinnings of foreign policy.
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Introduction
Since the Second World War, much American capital has flowed to the Global South.1 Despite the preva-
lence of conflict-inhibiting factors since the end of the Cold War (increasing democratisation and surging
globalisation), North-South military intervention remains common.2 In this article, we explore one domestic
actor that is often overlooked as a driver of U.S. intervention: the financial sector. The unprecedented in-
crease in North-to-South investment3 comes with important consequences for foreign policy decision-making:
surging North-South investment may have expanded the number of domestic actors in the U.S. (and, po-
tentially, other advanced industrial democracies) likely to support stabilising military intervention in the
South.4 Financial globalisation has increased the salience of foreign policy decisions to investors. With
mounting evidence that war generates sector-specific distributive effects (Camyar and Ulupinar, 2015) and
that policymakers are especially responsive to business groups (Jacobs and Page, 2005), an assessment of
the linkages between financial firms and foreign policy is apposite.
Existing works offer divergent accounts on the preferences of the financial sector. The Hobson-Lenin
view posits that capitalists favour activist foreign policies (Galtung, 1971; Hobson, 1938). An alterna-
tive perspective contends that financial firms oppose expansionist policies because they fear the disruptive
macroeconomic consequences of conflict (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2010; Kirshner, 2007; McDonald, 2009;
Rigobon and Sack, 2005; Schneider and Troeger, 2006). Both approaches envision financial interests shap-
ing foreign policy, but in different directions: the financial activist story sees finance as a motor of war,
while the financial pacifist narrative regards finance as a brake on conflict. Both interpretations suffer from
over-aggregation – finance is typically viewed as a monolithic actor with homogeneous preferences. Building
on the international political economy literature (IPE), we argue that financial firms have heterogeneous
preferences vis-a`-vis foreign intervention depending on their exposure to political risk. Consistent with the
Lucas Paradox (1990), investments in the Global South earn higher returns than investments in the North,
but also entail greater exposure to political risk. Because U.S. foreign intervention can potentially reduce
1The terms North and South are conventionally used to describe developed and developing countries, respectively (Thompson
and Reuveny, 2009). We adopt the World Bank (2015) definition of developing countries which includes all states with a
GNI/capita below $12,746.
2According to Pickering and Kisangani (2009), the U.S. intervened, on average, 1.7 times per year during the Cold War and
2.3 times per year after 1989.
3A recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report (available at
http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2014 en.pdf) notes that FDI flows to developing countries surpassed those
to developed countries in 2013.
4Military intervention is defined as the movement of regular troops of one country inside another in the context of political
disputes (Pickering and Kisangani, 2009). We adopt a broader view of military intervention which includes covert, aggressive
actions conducted by one country against another, such as CIA’s involvement in the 1973 coup against the Chilean President
Allende. A military intervention is an instance of military action by one state (or a coalition of states) that infringes upon the
sovereignty of another state (or would-be state in the case of third-party intervention in civil conflicts).
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political risks, we anticipate that North-South investors will favour an activist foreign policy. Hence, we
argue that North-South investment may expand the scope for U.S. foreign intervention.
If empirically corroborated, our claim challenges the idea that economic integration axiomatically reduces
conflict (Mousseau, 2016). “Capitalist peace” scholars view financial integration as a war inhibitor (Gartzke,
2007; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, 2001). Much of this literature focuses on a dyadic “capitalist peace,” with
less attention to processes within states.5 The nature of economic integration – whether investments flow
North to North or North to South – might translate into different foreign policy preferences for various
domestic players. To ascertain how investment impacts the foreign policy predilections of domestic actors,
we examine the sector most sensitive to financial globalisation – finance itself. If integrated capital markets
indeed deter war, we should find evidence of anti-war preferences among those with the greatest exposure
to disruptions of trade and investment. Finance’s foreign policy orientation is thus critical to the validity of
“capitalist peace” mechanisms. If the disruption mechanism holds, we should expect finance to be stridently
antiwar; if we observe the opposite, caution might be warranted.
This study also contributes to previous discussions on the sectoral underpinnings of foreign policy (Cam-
yar and Ulupinar, 2015; Fordham, 2008; Fordham and McKeown, 2003; Frieden, 1988; Narizny, 2007;
Trubowitz, 1999) by opening the “black box” of finance and distinguishing between firms with investment
in the developing world (the Global South) and firms that invest domestically or in wealthy countries (the
Global North). As we will later show, firms’ investment portfolio (whether investment is channeled towards
the North or the South) has a significant impact on their preferences vis-a`-vis U.S. intervention. Firms
with investments in the volatile South can reap considerable benefits by pushing their home countries to
take measures, including military intervention, that reduce political risk. Interventions can indeed be costly
but they can also protect investment assets, promote regional stability, and remove major obstacles to the
profitability of North-South investments.
We look at interventions through the prism of actor objectives. This is a conventional approach across
various research programs. For example, civil war scholars argue that third parties intervene in internal
conflicts to stabilise the region, maintain/gain geopolitical influence, protect ethnic kin, safeguard economic
interests, undermine interstate rivals, divert attention from domestic crises, or protect civilians caught in
the maelstrom of violence (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, 2008; Regan, Frank and Aydin, 2009;
Salehyan, 2009). From a broader IR perspective, realists hold that interventions are mainly driven by
national security interests while liberals contend that third parties intervene for humanitarian reasons (Choi,
5One exception is DiGiuseppe (2015) who finds that greater access to global capital markets weakens the ability of taxpayers
to constrain governments from going to war.
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2013). The literature analysing public opinion and foreign policy offers similar goal-oriented categorisations
of intervention. For instance, while discussing public attitudes vis-a`-vis U.S. military adventures, Eichenberg
(2005) identifies interventions aimed at addressing a humanitarian crisis, restraining other states, effecting
political change, or creating the adequate conditions for the introduction of peacekeepers.
We anticipate that financial firms’ preferences are mainly tied to a specific type of intervention objective:
reducing political risk.6 Specifically, we argue that North-South investors would be especially supportive
of stabilising interventions. This category includes interventions aimed at ensuring economic stability
(direct actions to protect property or prevent debt default)7 or intervention aimed at promoting regional
stability through peacekeepers or direct involvement in an ongoing conflict.8 Essentially, although they may
produce bouts of instability in the short term, stabilising interventions reduce political risk for investors in
the long term.
Reducing political risk raises the value of existing investments while creating opportunities for firms
with the expertise to invest in newly stabilised regions. Across several multinational corporation (MNC)
surveys, we see evidence that financiers worry about stability. In the 2016 PriceWaterhouseCoopers survey
of global CEOs, 74 percent expressed the view that geopolitical uncertainty was a major concern – a greater
proportion than those concerned about high taxes (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2016). In the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) survey of 191 MNCs, investors were concerned that host countries
might dishonour financial obligations, expropriate property, or experience conflict (MIGA, 2013: 17). The
literature on foreign direct investment, similarly, finds strong evidence that political risk influences investment
decisions (Jensen et. al., 2012: 27-82). Insofar as an activist foreign policy is necessary to reduce political
risks, we anticipate that North-South investors will be open to intervention, subject to strategic calculations
about the viability of alternative strategies and the potential costs of intervention.
To test our claim, we examine the U.S. financial sector’s political behaviour.9 An important way firms
hedge against political risk is by establishing relationships with political actors (MIGA, 2013: 37). By
examining campaign donation patterns of financial firms (and controlling for other donor motivations), we
can obtain important information about the revealed preferences of North-South investors. Using campaign
donation data from the 107th U.S. Congress, we hypothesise that financial sector donors with interests in
6Others (Kisangani and Pickering, 2017; Maurer, 2013) define this as intervention aimed at maintaining the status quo.
7Examples include the 1954 coup in Guatemala, the 1973 coup against Salvador Allende in Chile (which had defaulted on
foreign debt), tanker reflagging during the Iran-Iraq war, and efforts to destabilise the Ortega government in Nicaragua (which
had expropriated U.S. assets).
8Examples include: the peacekeeping missions in Lebanon (1982), Somalia (1993), Bosnia (1994), and Haiti (2004); third-
party intervention in the Gulf War (1991); or, the Afghanistan civil war (2001).
9Our analysis is most relevant to democracies with power projection capabilities, such as the United States, France, and the
UK.
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the Global South will be more likely to donate to members of Congress favoring stabilising intervention
in developing countries than to members opposing military intervention in such regions. South-oriented
finance expects to reap benefits through stabilising intervention. Such intervention can reduce political risk
by addressing geopolitical instability and deterring expropriation or debt default. The costs of intervention
in the Global South are often smaller than in the North because opponents in developing countries are
weaker and lack the power projection capability to retaliate against the home country of financial firms.10
Further, as we discuss below, Global South-oriented finance is uniquely able to evade the costs of conflict.
The evidence we marshal in this study provides strong support for our contention: firms that invest in the
Global South are more likely to favour stabilising interventions.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. First, we examine the scholarship that addresses the
nexus between finance and conflict. Subsequently, we discuss the foreign policy preferences of North-South
investors. Thereafter, we test our main proposition that Global South-oriented firms are likely to donate
to candidates that favour stabilising intervention in the Global South, employing a cross-sectional Tobit
regression of campaign donations from different financial firms to members of Congress in the 2002 elections.
We conclude by outlining the theoretical and practical implications of our findings.
Financial Pacifism vs. Financial Activism
Two dominant perspectives have emerged on how finance approaches foreign intervention. The first contends
that finance condones aggression because it opens new markets, protects investments abroad, and safeguards
economic interests. The second posits that financial firms fear trade disruptions or adverse macroeconomic
consequences, and thus tend to be more pacifist.
The first perspective encompasses scholars who advance a rapacious view of capitalism. The Hobson-
Lenin narrative holds that late-stage capitalist economies suffer decreasing returns at home (Hobson, 1938).
To reverse declining profits, states turn to military intervention abroad, generating new opportunities for
profitable exploitation (Galtung, 1971). Imperial rivalries on the periphery, in turn, often drive great power
conflict in the core (Wallerstein, 1984). 11 Other works stress investor protection as a motivation for foreign
intervention. Maurer (2013), for instance, argues that American investors in risky areas had considerable
10We recognise that certain developing countries, like China or Pakistan, possess considerable military power and/or nuclear
weapons (indeed, developing states may seek nuclear weapons because they see themselves as likely targets), complicating the
calculus of intervention. While these considerations preclude full-scale war, lower level forms of intervention remain viable (e.g.,
drone strikes in Pakistan).
11If true, this mechanism would urge some caution about “capitalist peace:” financial integration might prevent war between
dyads with shared investment ties, but could also push influential domestic groups to embrace aggressive policies towards third
parties.
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historical success in lobbying Washington to intervene against states that expropriated their property or
defaulted on debts. Subsequent quantitative analysis of voting patterns in the U.S. Senate found similar
evidence of Maurer’s “Empire Trap” hypothesis (Duran and Bucheli, 2017). However, institutional changes
have weakened the investor protection motive, particularly since the 1980s: investors now have access to
public and private compensation mechanisms; greater executive discretion limits the ability of aggrieved
firms to lobby Congress; and, bilateral investment treaties offer legal protection (as does the evolution of
international courts). Frieden (1989) also discusses the investor protection motive behind foreign interven-
tions. His account of declining intervention since the 1890s emphasises the shift away from investment in raw
materials. Since raw material investment is location-specific, it is vulnerable to expropriation. At the same
time, because access to resource-rich territory is all that a firm requires, it is easier for military intervention
to enable the resumption of production. Nevertheless, this is less true for intangible investments, such as
loans or FDI aimed at exploiting home-country advantages. Thus, the investor protection story is able to
explain both why intervention was common in the 19th and early 20th century, and why it is rarer today.
McDonald (2009), Narizny (2007), and Trubowitz (1999) argue that trade preferences can also explain
business group predilections vis-a`-vis military intervention. Economic sectors benefit differently from trade
and investment: import-competing firms lose from exposure to global markets while export-oriented firms
gain. Military intervention can substantially impact global flows. In McDonald’s formulation, war decreases
trade and investment between two countries, and encourages the beneficiaries of these activities to lobby
against confrontation. According to this account, many protectionist firms support intervention because
mercantilist barriers enable them to benefit from conflict. Narizny (2007) is more circumspect in this
regard: while outward-oriented interests are sometimes pacific (e.g., British coal vis-a`-vis a Europe-wide
conflagration), others are bellicist (e.g., the American South vis-a`-vis Europe in the 1930s). This variation
in sectoral preferences occurs because economic relations with different regions of the world entail different
strategies and different economic benefits. While few works examine the fiscal impact of war on the financial
sector quantitatively, recent studies suggest that war may benefit sectors of the economy beyond those with
a direct fiscal stake, such as the military-industrial complex. Camyar and Ulupinar (2015), for instance,
find that while conflict harms firms in the short-run, it increases capital productivity in the long-run. Other
work has found that historical assessments of the international environment by legislators run along sectoral
lines, with legislators tied to import-competing industries more likely to highlight risks (Flynn and Fordham,
2016).
Kirshner (2007) contrasts starkly with the rapacious capitalist perspective. In his view, the fear of
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macroeconomic instability leads finance to embrace pacifism. Wars are typically funded through higher
taxes, inflation, and debt (or a combination thereof). All of these activities impose particularly high costs
on the financial sector (Kirshner, 2007: 9-23). As a result, Kirschner argues, financial firms often lobby for
pacific foreign policies, even in the face of severe geopolitical threats. Adding to the debate, Brooks (2013)
goes even further. Noting that there have been no direct interventions to protect private property since 1975,
he argues that business groups no longer lobby for military intervention. In an era of extensive globalisation,
FDI presents firms with a viable alternative to conquest.
The above arguments establish plausible reasons that finance cares about foreign policy. Military inter-
vention creates new investment opportunities and ensures the protection of existing assets. On the flipside,
financial firms may fear macroeconomic instability and the disruption of trade or investment that follow
conflict. Additionally, firms will not lobby governments if they believe those governments already share their
interests, or if non-military mechanisms offer alternative means to protect assets. To our knowledge, the
combined effect of these non-mutually-exclusive motivations has not been extensively explored. We suggest
that firms, like any other business, seek to maximise risk-adjusted profits (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2010;
Schneider and Troeger, 2006). That means they care about opportunities for profit and macroeconomic
instability, but also about the political risk to their investments. Thus, the risk of geopolitical instability,
appropriation, and physical destruction is very much part of the strategic calculus for firms that invest
abroad. Current works offer little insight into how these and other drivers are likely to vary across types
of intervention and across financial firms. In short, there is a need for deeper analysis of financial sector’s
foreign policy preferences.
The Foreign Policy Preferences of North-South Investors
The financial sector consists of diverse actors (banking, insurance, securities firms) with multifarious goals.
Two key characteristics separate North-South investors from other financial firms: (a) a higher sensitivity to
political risk; and, (b) a greater ability to avoid paying for intervention. Given these differences, we expect
North-South investors to be particularly supportive of stabilising interventions in the Global South. We
elaborate this argument below.
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Political Risk and North-South Investment
Financial firms engage with the Global South in multiple ways. Some own controlling stakes in companies
that invest in the developing world. Other firms are exposed to the Global South through portfolio invest-
ment. They may own non-controlling stakes in MNCs that operate in the Global South, invest in firms
abroad, or lend to foreign governments and firms. Exposure varies – some companies are exposed to the
Global South broadly, others to a specific region or country. For example, the now-defunct FleetBoston
Financial Corporation owned $6 billion in Argentine debt.
The potential upside of North-South investment is significant. Returns on investment are typically higher
in developing countries. Because capital is relatively scarce in the Global South, many profitable investment
opportunities are unexploited. Despite an array of business opportunities, most global foreign investment
stocks are North-North. Only recently have North-South flows grown larger (UNCTAD, 2015). The most
influential explanation for this paradox emphasises political risk (Lucas, 1990). Investment in the South
is highly sensitive to disruption because Southern governments more frequently enact unfavourable policies
towards investors or experience adverse events, such as conflict, that harm investment. Although all investors
are exposed to political risk, the North-South ones are particularly vulnerable. Developing countries often
fail to protect investors because they lack the legal traditions and resources to enforce property rights. Levels
of openness are lower in the Global South, limiting the options for redress of aggrieved investors (Jensen,
2008). While authoritarian regimes protect the property of some actors, they favour those with ties to
regime insiders. Lacking fiscal capacity, developing countries often face intense budgetary pressures pushing
them toward default or expropriation. Many conflict-inhibiting factors, such as economic development and
democratisation, are also weaker in the developing world.
North-South investors worry openly about political risk. In the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA) survey of 191 MNCs, political risk was the most commonly listed constraint on FDI flows
in all but one year (MIGA, 2009-2013). Surveyed firms cited war (7%), terrorism (13%), civil disturbance
(33%), host country decisions regarding non-honouring financial obligations (31%), or expropriation (24%)
as political risks of concern in developing countries (MIGA, 2013: 17). North-South investors care about
both direct threats to their property (expropriation or default) and indirect geopolitical risks (e.g., war
or terrorism). Reductions in political risk also open up new investment opportunities. However, because
successful entry into a new market requires knowledge about local conditions and practices, existing North-
South investors are more likely to have the expertise necessary to exploit such opportunities. Most firms
that ‘go global’ are, at best, regional firms because expertise is hard to develop (Rugman, 2005).
8
There are multiple ways to reduce political risk in developing countries. International institutions like
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank’s International Center for the Settlement of
International Disputes (ICSID), increased democratisation, and growing dependence on capital inflows have
all enhanced the global protection of property rights. Yet, it is not entirely clear that the emerging global
property rights regime has eliminated political risks. Political risk insurance schemes like the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) might protect firms on the one hand, while encouraging investment
in riskier locales on the other.
Although outright expropriation is less common, political risk remains high in the Global South. Govern-
ments in the South may still default on debt or expropriate property without adequate compensation. MNCs
often undervalue their foreign holdings for tax purposes, resulting in disputes over compensation following
expropriation. Cash-strapped governments often violate agreements. When Southern governments face do-
mestic crises, they may choose expropriation and default even though they risk losing external confidence
or being shut out of global capital markets. Incensed voters or ‘rebels at the gates’ can be more immediate
concerns for leaders than the risk of a credit downgrade. Further, the conditions that lead countries to take
desperate actions in the first place might make them unlikely to compensate adversely impacted firms.
Although the loss of access to global capital markets is costly, countries can recover from such actions
(Tomz, 2007). A quick comparison of Malaysia and Indonesia during the 1997 East Asian crisis is illustrative.
Faced with a severe crisis, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad emphasised domestic stability
and opted for capital controls while the Indonesian President Suharto accepted IMF aid and conditionality.
Malaysia recovered from the crisis, Mahathir’s government retained office, and the implications for Malaysian
growth were minimal (Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001). By contrast, the crisis in Indonesia deepened and Suharto
was overthrown. Indeed, losing access to global capital markets post-default may actually serve the policy
goals of protectionist regimes.
We acknowledge that conflicts over expropriation or default can be resolved peacefully. Lenders may
accept steep ‘haircuts’ and forgive debt. As Maurer (2013) argues, bilateral investment treaties, interna-
tional courts, and other mechanisms may protect property rights globally today without the use of force.
Nonetheless, enforcement by international institutions is limited. The changing nature of global finance,
with increasing numbers of actors and growing private-private flows (and corresponding collective action
problems), may reduce the ability of third party organisations to broker mutually agreeable terms to lenders
and borrowers (Copelovitch, 2010). Further, current institutional mechanisms may depend on American
hegemony and implicit threats of force. Consider the patterns of IMF conditionality, one of the most impor-
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tant tools for ensuring that lenders are repaid. On average, countries indebted to G-5 banks receive harsher
conditions than those owing money to other actors (Copelovitch, 2010). If international institutions are
largely acting as repossession agents for American (or G-5) investors, declining hegemony may undermine
the global property rights regime.
We are not arguing that North-South investors favour military intervention willy-nilly. Indeed, we an-
ticipate that most firms would support multilateral processes for mitigating political risk, as these are less
costly than military ones. However, should peaceful efforts fail, we anticipate that North-South would prefer
governments willing to employ more coercive means. When the fear of losing access to capital markets is
not a powerful disincentive against repossession attempts, securing global property rights requires a more
direct enforcement mechanism, such as stabilising intervention. Do firms really lobby governments to in-
tervene on their behalf? The release of declassified CIA documents in the 1990s supports this logic. In
1953, an Anglo-American coup deposed the Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, after he na-
tionalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Maurer, 2013: 301-310). In 1954, the CIA masterminded a coup
against Guatemalan President Jacobo A`rbenz whose government had expropriated property of the United
Fruit Company (a U.S. firm with substantial holdings across Central America). In 1973, a U.S.-condoned
coup toppled the Chilean President Salvador Allende whose regime engaged in the nationalisation of U.S.
investments in the copper industry and defaulted on foreign debt (Nixon Tapes, 2016).
Although we lack declassified documents regarding more recent interventions, it is clear that: a) the
United States is willing to intervene on behalf of investor interests, even in the case of small ones; and, b)
investors know that it pays to have friends in Washington. For instance, when Oscar Cerna, a U.S. citizen who
owned a factory in Honduras, alleged indirect expropriation of his cement factory, he appealed to the highest
channels in Washington where his concerns received a sympathetic hearing (U.S. Congress, 2011). Given
the eventual U.S. role in brokering the outcome of the 2009 coup against Manuel Zelaya, Cerna’s strategy
made a lot of sense (see Clinton, 2014: 638-646). Indeed, some of the most prominent financial backers
of a broadly interventionist foreign policy agenda include luminaries of the financial world. For instance,
before becoming National Security Advisor, John Bolton ran a SuperPAC promoting military intervention.
In 2016, the largest campaign contributor was Robert Mercer, co-founder of the hedge fund Renaissance
Technologies, while overall 77.2 percent of the SuperPAC’s funds came from finance (Center For Responsive
Politics, 2018). Paul Singer, the CEO of Elliott Management and a prominent funder of neo-conservative
causes like the Foundation for the Defence of Democracies (Clifton, 2015), is another illustrative example of
the plausible nexus between intervention and finance. Elliott purchased distressed debt at deeply discounted
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prices and then insisted on full repayment. The firm once famously repossessed an Argentine warship and was
ultimately repaid in full by the Argentine government. Plenty of investors see the advantages of promoting
a foreign policy strategy that takes an interventionist approach to the Global South.
Stabilising intervention in the Global South protects property rights and provides multiple benefits to
North-South investors. Intervention can replace hostile regimes with friendlier ones, as in Iran, Guatemala,
and Chile. Intervention may also deter other governments contemplating nationalisation measures, enhancing
the negotiating position of MNCs in disputes with host countries. Faced with the prospect of foreign
intervention and removal from office, regimes might reconsider their expropriation agendas — costly austerity
might be preferable to foreign intervention or an externally-sponsored coup. Sanctions may be an alternative
to stabilising intervention, but are generally ineffective, encourage more expropriation (Peksen, 2016), and
are unpopular among North-South investors. While sanctions impose costs on property rights violators, they
do not directly prevent expropriation or default (Pape, 1997). Moreover, sanctions are at cross-purposes with
investors and lenders who want to do business with the targeted country.
Another type of political risk that disproportionately threatens North-South investment is war. While
interstate wars are less common today, internal conflicts remain frequent occurrences and predominantly
occur in the South. Internal conflicts are longer-lasting, harder to resolve, more prone to recidivism, and
more likely to end in stalemates than interstate wars (Brandt et al., 2008). These type of conflicts often
destroy property (see the ongoing strife in Syria and Iraq), place inordinate fiscal burdens on combatants,
and disrupt economic activities. These are undesirable outcomes for North-South investors, prompting
many to favour aggressive efforts to resolve conflicts.12 In some civil wars, third party intervention might be
the preferred route to stability. This might involve international peacekeeping operations which keep both
sides at bay and provide conflict-inhibiting information about conflict parties’ capabilities and willingness
to fight. In other cases, this might involve biased intervention aimed at ending the war as soon as possible.
While there is some evidence that third party interventions generally prolong civil conflicts (Regan, 2002)
or institutionalise military stalemates (Fortna, 2008), biased interventions can hasten victory for the side
preferred by the third party entrant (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, 2008), particularly if the third
party is a great power.
Overall, geopolitical instability is toxic to North-South investors. Peacekeeping or, alternatively, military
intervention can restore peace either by separating combatants or by intervening on one side of the dispute.
Intervention is beneficial both to firms with interests in war-torn countries and to other firms within the
12North-South investors would obviously prefer peaceful solutions to civil wars in the Global South. However, problems of
uncertainty, commitment, and issue indivisibility often make peace elusive (Fearon, 1995).
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region that fear conflict contagion. 13 Continued post-conflict troop presence may provide additional benefits.
Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) find evidence that American FDI flows follow American troop deployments.
Although few firms desire to invest in an active combat zone, troops are often followed by risk insurance
through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). In addition, American firms may be favoured
in bids for contracts to provide services for military bases and postwar reconstruction. With knowledge of
potential new markets often concentrated among a few firms, collective action among North-South firms may
also be easier to resolve.14
Domestically-oriented financial firms and North-North investors do not have the same incentives as North-
South investors – they lack the expertise to benefit from the opening of new markets and invest in markets
where political risk is of little concern. Indeed, a boom in North-South investment triggered by increased
geopolitical stability might even draw capital away from domestic activities (Danzman et al., 2017). For
instance, while the early 1990s saw a boom in investment in emerging markets, the 1997 East Asian Crisis
triggered a move to safe harbours like the U.S. Flush with capital from East Asian savers, capital poured
into domestic American activities like real estate. Firms that are capital competitors with the Global
South are highly unlikely to lobby in favour of intervention in the Global South, and may even favour anti-
interventionist candidates. In sum, we believe that, relative to other financial firms, North-South investors
prefer home-country governments that use stabilising intervention to protect them against expropriation,
default, or destruction should the global property rights regime fall short.
The Costs of Intervention
Foreign interventions can be costly for investors. Intervention is destructive and can prompt the seizure of
physical goods, particularly if a conflict turns badly. Intervention can destabilise the target country and,
possibly, an entire region. Intervention can also be macroeconomically disruptive for the home country.
Intervention (and subsequent reconstruction or occupation) is typically funded with inflation, taxes, or debt
– policies that financial firms oppose (Kirshner, 2007). Conflict is also alienating: military intervention risks
the enmity of other states that may be prospective or active clients of financial companies. Indeed, because
intervention is costly, we anticipate that few financial firms will favour intervention as a first resort to threats.
Nevertheless, intervention in the Global South is typically less expensive than intervention in the Global
North. Unlike North-North interventions, North-South interventions are less injurious to macroeconomic
13Maurer (2013: 59) notes that bond markets responded favorably to U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1905.
14Kirshner (2007) claims that financial firms lobby against war because they fear its adverse macroeconomic effects. Yet, the
constituency in favour of macroeconomic stability is surely far more diffuse than that which might benefit from any particular
interventionist move.
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stability due to their asymmetric nature. States in the Global South tend to be militarily weak, lack the
reach capabilities to retaliate, and can be confronted without total warfare. The American historical record
is instructive in this regard: even in the case of unsuccessful large-scale interventions, the macroeconomic
impact was marginal. American war spending on the Vietnam debacle peaked at 2.3% of GDP while Iraq
occupation (2003-2011) costs peaked at 1% of GDP – a far cry from WWII whose costs reached 35.8% of
GDP (Dagget, 2010). This discrepancy would be even larger if we look at instances of stabilising intervention,
such as the clandestine campaigns in Guatemala, Iran and Chile, at peacekeeping missions, such as that in
Somalia or Haiti, or at shorter military interventions like the first Gulf War. The message here is clear:
stabilising interventions in the South can often be sustained by great powers with minimal macroeconomic
consequences at home.
North-South investors are also well-placed to evade the costs of intervention. North-South investors hold
more diverse investment portfolios than domestically-oriented finance, limiting the impact of macroeconomic
instability induced by the conflict (Cosset and Suret, 1995). While this is also true for North-North investors,
the North is more economically interdependent than the South (Thompson and Reuveny, 2009). Macroe-
conomic instability in the United States is most likely to impact the EU and Japan, reducing the utility of
diversification. Common tactics for evading the fiscal cost of war, such as transfer pricing, are less viable in
the North. Further, developing countries rarely occupy central positions in alliance networks, which limits
possible blowback from intervention. While some developing countries are backed by great powers, such
relationships are often tenuous. Egypt, for instance, had few qualms about switching sides in the Cold War
following the Yom Kippur War (1973). Hence, the type of stabilising intervention favoured by North-South
investors can often be conducted with limited disruption. North-North firms may be slightly better able
than purely domestic ones to evade the costs of paying for intervention due to their greater diversification
and access to strategies like transfer pricing. Yet, insofar as foreign intervention incurs fiscal costs, few are
better equipped to evade those costs than North-South investors.
To summarise, North-South investors are particularly exposed to political risks, compared to North-
North or purely domestic investment. Moreover, North-South firms are also well-equipped to evade the costs
of military intervention. Hence, we hypothesise that South-oriented firms will tend to support stabilising
intervention in the Global South, relative to other financial actors. We believe that financial firms, like most
economic actors, will use all available tools to attempt to promote the adoption of favourable policies by
relevant policymakers. While we anticipate that firms use a variety of means to influence policy, campaign
donations have the advantage of being highly visible. Accordingly, our expectation is that:
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H: Financial firms with greater exposure to the Global South will tend to give more dona-
tions to congressional candidates who are more interventionist and less to candidates who are
less interventionist.
Following Berry et al.’s (2012) recommendation, we also derive a corollary to our main hypothesis which
captures how the effect of interventionism varies based on levels of firm exposure to the Global South.
Hcorollary: The effect of interventionism on donations will be negative for low levels of expo-
sure to the Global South, negligible for medium levels of exposure, and positive for high levels
of exposure to the Global South.
Research Design and Data
Dependent Variable
We expect that South-oriented firms are more likely than North-oriented or domestic firms to support U.S.
congressional candidates who favour stabilising intervention in the Global South. To test this conjecture, we
constructed two campaign donation datasets, one of House Representative-PAC dyads (440 House Repre-
sentatives and 66 financial firms with PACs), and one of Senator-PAC dyads (100 Senators and 66 financial
firms with PACs).15 Our dependent variable is Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions (donations)
to House or Senate members by Fortune 500 financial firms in the 107th Congress (January 3rd, 2001 –
January 3rd, 2003), drawn from the Federal Election Commission (FEC, 2018).16 The 107th Congress was
selected because it featured serious debates about the course of American grand strategy in the wake of the
9/11 terrorist attacks. In line with earlier work (Levitt, 1995), we recognise that campaign donations may
reflect both genuine support and strategic logic. Firms may donate to a legislator they dislike in exchange
for access, particularly if that legislator is a congressional leader or sits on a congressional committee. 17
By controlling for these other motivations, campaign donations can effectively gauge the revealed preferences
of donors toward foreign policy (Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal, 1987). If our conjecture is correct, financial
15The list of included firms and legislators is provided in the supplementary materials.
16Financial sector firms were identified based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.
17Firms might also donate to a legislator they dislike if that candidate faces an even worse challenger. Unfortunately,
comprehensive data on the foreign policy views of challengers does not exist. Moreover, it is unclear who will challenge each
legislator for most of their term in office.
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firms with greater exposure to the South will channel more campaign contributions to legislators that favour
stabilising intervention in the South, as opposed to less interventionist legislators.
Using campaign donation data to capture the revealed preferences of donors runs up against an important
problem in statistics known as censorship. Data is censored where some values are unobserved due to the
nature of the data. For instance, campaign donations cannot be negative and in the 107th Congress were
capped at $5000. A conservative donor might give $0 to the left-leaning Bernie Sanders and $0 to the
more moderate Joe Lieberman, even though they preferred Lieberman over Sanders. Censored data might
approximate a normal distribution over the observable range of outcomes but will be clustered at $0 and
$5000. Tobit regressions were designed to address issues of censorship (Sigelman and Zeng, 1999). Rather
than assuming that all data points are drawn from the same normal distribution, the Tobit model accounts
for the fact that data clustering at the cut-points contain important unobserved information.
Independent Variable
To test our hypothesis, we need to capture both a financial firm’s exposure to the Global South and a
legislator’s support for intervention in the Global South. Our independent variable is an interaction term
composed of the product of financial donor exposure to the South and a legislator’s support for intervention
in the South (North-South exposure*interventionism). Therefore, we need measures of both North-South ex-
posure and interventionism. Unfortunately, company reports do not list detailed information about regional
holdings but typically lump developed and developing countries together.18 As a consequence, we employed
an indirect metric to gauge North-South exposure – the relationship between a firm’s stock price and the
economic fortunes of the Global South. Using 2001-02 stock price data from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP, 2016), we ran ARIMA regressions of the stock prices of all Fortune 500 financial
firms using the Templeton Emerging Markets mutual fund (the oldest and largest emerging market fund
in 2002), the S&P 500 index, and a weighted index of mutual funds specialising in Europe and Japan as
regressors.19 Our unit of analysis was the business day (there were 500 business days for our temporal frame,
2001-02, on the New York Stock Exchange). Since the Templeton fund consists entirely of investments in the
developing world, its performance should synchronise with the South more generally. Because it is possible
that North-North firms are distinct from both North-South and domestically oriented firms, we also mea-
sured the North-North exposure of a firm by including a weighted index of Blackrock’s Europe Fund and the
18In addition, some exposure can sometimes tell us more than the location of investments. For instance, if one built a port
in the United States, one would still be exposed to external economic fluctuations.
19In the Supplementary Materials, we offer details on the ARIMA regressions.
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Aberdeen Japan Fund (CRSP, 2018). The relative weight of each fund was derived by looking at the relative
contribution of Europe and Japan to U.S. overseas income in 2002 (BEA, 2018). Finally, by controlling for
the overall movements of the S&P 500 index, we also accounted for general shifts in the market. Based
on separate Dickey-Fuller and Box-Ljung tests for each firm, an AR(1) component was added to address
autocorrelation. All results were then mean-centered.
The results of the ARIMA model exhibited good face value. The majority of firms clustered around
the mean, lacking statistically significant z-statistics.20 Insurance companies and firms with real-estate
ties tended to have lower scores while investment banks displayed higher scores; commercial banks lay in
the middle. Some examples are instructive. FleetBoston had the highest North-South z-statistic at 1.87,
suggesting high exposure to the South – an expected result given the firm’s exposure to the 1999-2002
Argentinian financial crisis (Hechinger, 2002). On the other hand, FleetBoston’s exposure to the Global
North was lower, as implied by the North-North z-statistic of 0.65. First American Corporation, a firm
involved in insurance and real estate, is a good example of a domestically oriented firm for which international
investment booms draw away scarce capital. First American had the lowest North-South z-statistic at -3.24,
implying that the firm does well when the Global South performs poorly, and a North-North z-statistic of
-0.18. Finally, JP Morgan Chase, a large commercial bank, is a good example of a firm with little exposure
to the Global South but high exposure to the North. JP Morgan’s North-South z-statistic was -.02, while
its North-North z-statistic was 2.54.21
Next, we measured interventionism, a legislator’s support for stabilising intervention in the South. To
operationalise the concept, we selected five key House votes and six key Senate votes described in the
Congressional Quarterly (CQ, 2015). We picked foreign policy votes that were high-profile, contentious,
involved interventions in the South, and took place between 1994 and 2002. Some of the votes were aimed
at supporting an intervention, in which case a ‘yes’ vote was interpreted as interventionist. In other cases,
legislation aimed to curtail an ongoing intervention; hence, a ‘no’ vote was considered interventionist. We
focused on cases that fit our definition of stabilising intervention – intervention against regimes with a
record of expropriating American property/defaulting on American debt or intervention aimed at promoting
regional stability. 22 The cases included are listed in Table 1. The percentage of times a legislator member
20Given our objective – the development of a measure of exposure to the South – the lack of statistical significance in many
cases is not problematic.
21These ARIMA results are included in the Supplementary Materials.
22We note that our measure is not simply capturing partisanship or “hawkishness” more broadly. For instance, in the 1990s
there were many Republicans, such as Ron Paul, who opposed “nation-building,” while some Democrats, like Robert Wexler,
favoured a more active role in the Global South. Our interventionists broadly included a mix of hardliners and internationalists
in the parlance of foreign party orientation.
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Table 1: Congressional votes (1994-2002) used in the construction of the interventionism index
Intervention vote Year of vote
Withdraw U.S. Troops from Haiti 1994
Bosnia Troop Deployment Prohibition 1995
Kosovo Authorisation 1999
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act 2002
Iraq Authorisation 2002
Support for Plan Colombia 2002
voted for the interventionist position became their score on our interventionism index.23
With a measure of firm exposure to the South (North-South exposure) and legislator support for in-
tervention in the South (interventionism), we interacted the terms to form our main independent variable
(North-South exposure*interventionism). The interaction term should be high for matched pairs (firms
exposed to the South with interventionist representatives and low-exposure firms with non-interventionist
representatives) and low for mismatched pairs. For instance, we might expect FleetBoston to favour an
interventionist candidate like John Murtha, while a more parochial firm like First American Corporation
would disfavour him.
Control Variables
In our analysis, we controlled for several factors that might influence PAC donations to a particular candidate.
Financial firms might broadly prefer conservative legislators. Accordingly, we included ideology, a variable
containing the NOMINATE score of each legislator, ranging from 0 (very liberal) to 1 (very conservative).24
We also examined each legislator’s voting record on salient issues for financial firms – financial regulation,
taxation, and bailouts. This variable (pro-finance) included the percentage of time legislators voted for a
‘pro-finance’ position – lax financial regulation, lower capital taxation, support for bailouts – in previous
sessions.25 We controlled for party as well (Republicans = 1; Democrats = 0). Additionally, members of the
congressional leadership (the speaker, majority leader, minority leader, and whips) are more influential than
others. Firms may donate money to congressional leaders in order to gain access, regardless of foreign policy
preferences. We capture congressional leaders with a leadership dummy variable, using information from
Heitshusen (2008). Because powerful committees can stop bills from reaching the floor, we also anticipate
23All measures were mean-centered. More discussion on the selected votes can be found in the Supplementary Materials.
24NOMINATE score data were obtained from Poole and Rosenthal (2007).
25Voting data were obtained from CQ Press (2018). We provide details about the construction of this variable in the
Supplementary Materials.
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larger donations to legislators on committees pertinent to finance (e.g. the House Committee on Financial
Services and the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee). Committee was thus included
as a dummy variable equaling 1 for members and 0 for non-members.26 Furthermore, junior legislators may
differ systematically in their ability to attract donors and in their likelihood of voting for interventionism
(most of a junior legislator’s votes would have been post-9/11). As such, we controlled for number of years
in office. Finally, Senators up for reelection are likely to raise more money than those with many years left
in their term. Therefore, in our Senate model we included a dummy (election) for whether a Senator faced
re-election in 2002. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the Senate and the House
Senate Min. Mean Max St. dev.
donations 0 358.511 5000 1256.35
North-South exposure -3.24 -0.09 1.87 0.99
North-North exposure -3.55 0.21 3.69 1.09
interventionism -0.49 0 0.34 0.20
ideology -0.58 0.03 0.63 0.35
party (Republican=1) 0 0.50 1 0.50
leadership 0 0.04 1 0.19
committee 0 0.41 1 0.49
pro-finance -0.56 0 0.43 0.447
seniority 1 12.33 46 10.30
elections 2002 0 0.29 1 0.45
House
donations 0 49.00 5000 326.84
North-South exposure -3.24 -0.09 1.87 0.99
North-North exposure -3.55 0.21 3.69 1.09
interventionism -0.64 0 0.35 0.21
ideology -0.71 0.07 1.01 0.47
party (Republican=1) 0 0.51 1 0.50
leadership 0 0.01 1 0.10
committee 0 0.15 1 0.36
pro-finance -0.61 0 0.38 0.33
seniority 0 8.69 37 6.38
Empirical Evidence
The results of the cross-sectional Tobit model support our hypothesis that financial firms with greater
exposure to the South are more likely to donate to legislators supporting intervention in the South (Tables 3
and 4). The independent variable, the interaction term exposure*interventionism, was statistically significant
26Committee data came from Nelson (1993-1994), and Stewart and Woon (2011).
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and positive across the House and the Senate.27 Based on the empirical findings, we can affirm with some
confidence that, where a legislator was more interventionist towards the South and a prospective donor was
more exposed to the South, donations were typically higher. Interestingly, interventionism was statistically
insignificant in the House, while positive in the Senate. This is an important finding in itself as it casts
doubt on arguments that financial firms uniformly oppose intervention in the developing world. Our results
indicate that finance’s foreign policy preferences are quite heterogeneous and largely depend on existing, or
prospective, ties with the Global South. The higher a firm’s financial exposure to the South, the greater
the financiers’ favourability toward stabilising interventions. Firms with high North-North exposure did not
perform the same way – there was no interactive effect between North-North exposure and interventionism
in either the House or the Senate. Across all models, leadership and committee membership were positive,
supporting the idea that access is an important motivation for donations. A pro-finance voting record was
beneficial in the House. Senators running for reelection in 2002 received significantly more donations than
others. Controlling for other factors, Democrats also received more donations than Republicans.
Table 3: South-oriented finance and Senate Donations
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
North-South exposure 500.840***(105.469) 500.846***(105.454) 474.151***(105.966)
North-North exposure 412.445***(94.938) 403.604***(95.604) 412.402***(94.851)
interventionism 3003.127***(566.990) 2886.009***(586.884) 3012.325***(566.948)
North-South exposure × interv. 1050.584**(502.576)
North-North exposure × interv. 343.673(453.891)
ideology 1793.306*(958.595) 1785.050*(958.504) 1768.023*(957.688)
party (Republican=1) -1388.579**(584.334) -1387.052**(584.281) -1382.072**(583.854)
leadership 2230.993***(498.726) 2230.992***(498.624) 2223.686***(498.301)
committee 1774.317***(217.669) 1775.418***(217.681) 1775.096***(217.560)
pro-finance 1722.587(518.560) 1728.892(518.698) 1737.922(518.639)
seniority -84.872***(12.649) -84.867***(12.650) -84.610***(12.640)
elections 2002 4471.136***(247.803) 4470.865***(247.785) 4468.412***(247.619)
Constant -6722.444***(409.850) -6720.004***(409.800) -6724.841***(409.782)
sigma e 4921.938***(166.395) 4921.436***(166.377) 4970.302***(166.223)
N 6500 6500 6500
AIC 16799.90 16801.33 16797.52
Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05
We also report the marginal effects for each interaction effect (Figure 1). This approach allows us to
ascertain the impact of interventionism on donations across different levels of North-South exposure (Panels
1a and 1b). House data exhibited the most striking evidence of an interaction. For firms with the lowest
27Statistical significance for an interaction term does not represent an average effect (Brambor et al., 2006). For evidence of
average effects, observing the marginal effects (or expected value of the dependent variable) of some variable X on some variable
Y, for various levels of an interacting variable Z is more useful.
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Table 4: South-oriented finance and House Donations
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
North-South exposure 845.189***(59.684) 845.106***(59.683) 838.296***(59.659)
North-North exposure 71.338(50.085) 69.864(50.275) 70.978(50.072)
interventionism 279.895(254.133) 255.512(266.931) 131.571(264.397)
North-South exposure × interv. 613.788***(261.157)
North-North exposure × interv. 80.199(236.374)
ideology 178.411(339.679) 177.845(339.691) 172.685(339.130)
party (Republican=1) -927.314***(315.714) -926.894***(315.724) -923.836***(315.300)
leadership 1591.782***(389.243) 1592.500***(389.227) 1589.571***(389.141)
committee 1343.163***(125.435) 1343.382***(125.441) 1342.225***(125.431)
pro-finance 1478.057***(271.148) 1478.378***(271.165) 1478.427***(271.064)
seniority 7.816(8.296) 7.810(8.296) 7.802(8.296)
Constant -6451.543***(254.323) -6451.520***(254.323) -6450.163***(254.132)
sigma e 3542.838(33604.56) 3543.113***(305.069) 3540.796(80816.8)
N 28600 28600 28600
AIC 24119.70 24121.58 24116.17
Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05
exposure to the South, the marginal effect of candidate interventionism was weakly statistically significant
and negative with the entire 95% confidence interval lying below zero. For firms with the greatest exposure
to the South, the effect of interventionism on donations was positive and statistically significant – a swing
of about $280 in donations. The picture in the Senate was somewhat similar. The marginal effect of
interventionism was statistically insignificant among firms with low exposure to the Global South, but
positive and significant among those firms with high North-South exposure – a swing of about $404 in
donations. The effects of interventionism did not seem to be modified as much by North-North exposure.
In the House, interventionism was statistically insignificant across all levels of North-North exposure. In
the Senate, the effects of interventionism were positive and statistically significant across nearly all values
of North-North exposure, suggesting the absence of an interaction. Overall, the evidence suggests that
parochial and North-North firms prefer House members opposed to intervention in the South while North-
South investors favour legislators with a penchant for stabilising intervention in the Global South. Overall,
the results corroborate our main expectation: greater exposure to the South predicted higher donations
from firms. That effect was weakest for anti-interventionist representatives and strongest for interventionist
legislators.
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Figure 1: Average marginal effects of exposure to the Global North/South and interventionism on
donations (based on Models 3 and 6)28
1a: The effect of candidate interventionism on donations, conditional on levels of firm exposure to the
Global North
1b: The effect of candidate interventionism on donations, conditional on levels of firm exposure to the
Global South
Conclusion
In this study, we argued that the ways in which globalisation has reshaped the domestic politics of foreign
policy are less clear-cut than ‘capitalist peace’ theorists would have us believe. We argued that North-South
28The horizontal axis also plots the distribution of the exposure to Global North/South variable.
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investors – who are growing in number – are more inclined to support stabilising interventions in the devel-
oping world. Because North-South investors are more sensitive to political risks, such as expropriation, debt
default, and destructive military conflict, they have distinct preferences from other financial firms. Such firms
are also better equipped to evade the costs of intervention, which tend to be low for the type of intervention
they prefer. The empirical evidence provided strong support for our argument – firm exposure to the Global
South predicted greater donations to legislators with a record of supporting stabilising interventions in the
Global South.
Our findings carry important implications. Our study contributes to ‘capitalist peace’ debate. While
economic interdependence reduces dyadic conflict, it may also generate pressure for an activist foreign policy
in the region of one’s major economic partners. Greater North-South integration enlarges the set of domestic
interests that gain from intervention in the developing world. To be clear, based on the empirical findings, we
are not arguing that military intervention in the Global South is driven by the interests of the finance sector
alone. Rather, our results show that, for some types of firms, military intervention has positive externalities
(e.g., ensuring stability in a region ripe for investment).
We hope that future work can expand on the ideas developed herein. As documents concerning key foreign
policy decisions are declassified, qualitative assessments of our argument can be undertaken. In addition, we
only examined the U.S. which is unique in many respects (e.g. power, size, centrality to global finance, lax
campaign finance laws). Our theory should be further tested in other contexts to delineate its precise scope.
For instance, the growth of state capitalist China as a source of FDI and the prospect of a shift from a world
of open globalisation to one of superpower spheres of influence (Lake, 2018) represent arenas that might
expand the terrain for investor pressure on foreign policy. Finally, contemporary developments in American
politics heighten the importance of our argument. Changes to campaign finance reform laws greatly expand
the ability of special interests to promote policy outcomes with concentrated benefits, but diffuse costs. If
investors become increasingly able to influence foreign policy, they could make riskier investments abroad
knowing that great power patrons will rescue them in the face of political risks.
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